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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of China on the world stage poses important questions about its economic consequences 
for that and other regions of the world and demands powerful methodologies able to quantify its 
challenges and opportunities.  
Somehow, Chinese geographical frontiers become “blurred” in this process. On the one hand, China has 
been escalating positions as a favorable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination, ranking now second 
among top hosts of FDI inflows in the world (UNCTAD, 2013). FDI seems to play an important role in 
Chinese GDP growth (e.g., Kim, Lyn & Zychowicz, 2003) and foreign trade (e.g., Dean, Lovely, & Mora, 
2009). Some authors have pointed out that in the absence of FDI flows, the Chinese high rates of GDP 
growth and exports would be in danger (Whalley & Xin, 2010; Zhang, 2014).On the other hand, a 
significant part of what is produced in (and later exported from) China relies heavily on foreign imported 
intermediates. What does, then, the “made in China” really mean? What can other regions expect from it? 
In this paper, we try to reply to these questions. To that aim, we use a multilevel analysis which considers 
the interplay of six regions in which the world economy has been split.  
In the study of international business, as well as in other areas, there has been an increasing interest in 
multilevel methodologies (Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007; Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 1999). A multilevel 
approach allows combining several levels of analysis to illuminate the multiple causes or consequences of 
behaviors at and across those levels. For example, different aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI) can 
be studied, such as its differential impact across networks, sectors, countries or regions, depending on 
technologies of production, export orientation, import reliance, among other factors. It seems intuitive that 
there must be some relationships between these higher and lower levels, even though the literature strands 
analyzing them tend to be disconnected.   
The present study adds to the multilevel literature by means of a bottom-up methodology. In other words, 
our approach incorporates the real data on total costs and production in the different sectors of the regions 
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we consider, and their multiple foreign trade connections through networks, which underlie their 
corresponding results at higher levels (such as GDP growth, aggregate foreign trade and welfare). We thus 
try to shed some light on the policies each country might take to get better off after the growing 
importance of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs ) in China, considering the complexity associated in 
global networks and the co-evolution of FDI and trade (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). 
Imported intermediate inputs embodied in exports have raised close attention to production networks. 
Koopman, Wang & Wei (2008) disentangle the imported intermediate inputs from domestic ones in 
Chinese exports. They obtain that only 40-50% of the value added is created in China, the rest being 
imported mainly from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the U.S. Dean, Fung & Wang (2011) find 
that there is a significant Asian-supplier network, with Japan and the Four Tigers accounting for more than 
half of Chinese imported inputs in 1997 and 2002. Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) suggest that trade 
related to production networks has shifted heavily towards “Factory Asia” and away from “Factory North 
America” and “Factory Europe”.  
We analyze the interplay of FDI accruing to China with the presence of global production networks. The 
regions considered are China, East Asia, Japan, EU28, the U.S. and the rest of the world (ROW). The 
Chinese sectors receiving FDI are Electronics, Machinery, Chemicals and Textiles, which constitute 
62.6% and 52.8% of its overall exports and imports in 2007, respectively. We pay particular attention to 
the role of these sectors along several levels of analysis, such as their weight in GDP, imports and exports 
in the world, in China and in the rest of regions. The multilevel methodology relies on a well-grounded 
quantitative framework in order to derive the consistent micro and macroeconomic results. It also 
combines both the demand and supply side of the economy, as well as, product and labor markets across 
regions (Latorre, 2010, Chapter 1). Buckley (2007) has pointed out that globalization has different speeds 
in markets of goods than in labor markets. Both types of markets will be accounted for in this analysis.    
The model, thus, captures the presence of Asian production networks, together with the main destinations 
of final and intermediate goods produced by China. However, we go beyond the data describing the 
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presence of networks and try to quantify the consequences of the particular linkages of each region with 
the Chinese economy. In theory, FDI inflows may have multiple effects. They affect factors remunerations, 
investment, GDP growth, technological transfers and productivity, the climate of competition among firms, 
foreign trade, and so on (see Meyer, 2008; Caves, 2007; Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2004; Lipsey, 2002, 
for reviews of the literature). A small handful of big MNEs may transform the production landscape of 
entire countries. However, comprehensive studies of their impact are rather scarce (Latorre, 2009). 
The literature on FDI or networks in China often offers studies which are descriptive and lack 
methodological rigor as pointed out in the review of Zhao, Flynn, & Roth, (2007) and also by Lyles, Flynn, 
& Frohlich (2008). Other studies employ robust methodologies but focus on particular aspects, such as, 
Tian (2007) and Meyer & Sinanis (2009), which analyze spillover effects of FDI; or Chen & Chen (1998), 
which delve into the relationship between networks and FDI in Taiwanese firms investing in China and 
other regions. This latter study illustrates how networks can facilitate entering a market, such as the 
Chinese one, in which institutions facilitating internalization may not work well. It could be seen as a 
particular specification of the broader theory of the “Liability of outsidership” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), 
which develops that idea that “insidership in relevant network(s) is necessary for successful 
internationalization” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009: 1411). One of the innovations of our analysis lies in the 
fact that we synthesize FDI, trade effects and global production networks, as suggested by Itaki (1991), in 
a framework considering economy-wide effects across countries and regions. We thus try to address some 
of the pending areas that according to Meyer (2004) exist in the research agenda on MNEs in emerging 
economies. Meyer (2004: 260-1) points out that “international business research has been largely looking 
into the MNE, rather than ‘looking out’ from MNEs to the societies in which they are operating” and that 
“One of the challenges is to tie the partial views discussed in different literatures together to allow 
comprehensive assessments” (Meyer, 2004: 261). In sum, we try to offer a holistic view of the 
consequences of the complex globalization of China.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 fully describes the role of the different regions as 
production centers, intermediate suppliers and final markets. Section 3 describes the multilevel model and 
simulations. The results are analyzed in section 4, while section 5 concludes. 
DATA 
Our model relies on the real data for the world economy provided by the GTAP8 Data Base (Nayaranan, 
Aguiar & McDougall, 2012), which we split in six regions and fifteen sectors. Figure 1 reflects the 
different levels of data. Beginning from the top, the model incorporates the weight of the six regions in the 
world economy (China, Japan, East Asia
1
, U.S., EU28 and the rest of the world, ROW). These regions, in 
turn, have 15 sectors (13 manufactures, agriculture and services), for which there is a complete set of real 
values about their total costs (bottom level of Figure 1). We can see that these costs include capital and 
labor remunerations, as well as domestic and imported intermediates. Labor costs have been rising in the 
last years in China. But MNEs want to lower total costs, which is what we include in our analysis. On the 
other hand, data on imported intermediates is of upmost importance for the analysis of global production 
networks. The more foreign investors source internationally, the lower the opportunities for local firms 
will be. This would moderate the positive impact on the host economy.  
Figure 1 gives an outline (GDP, exports and imports) of regions’ shares in the world2. The information 
refers to the year 2007. Europe is the largest economy (31% of world GDP), ranking first also in world 
trade (about 40%). The U.S. and ROW come next in their GDP shares (both around 25%) but they are 
very different in their trade openness. The US is a quite close economy, so is Japan, although less 
intensively. China and East Asia, by contrast, are more open since their weight in world trade surpasses 
their 6.3% and 5.2% shares in GDP, respectively. 
(Figure 1 AROUND HERE) 
Table 1 offers the definition of the 15 sectors and their relative importance in each region’s GDP, exports 
and imports. The GDP structure reflects the level of development of the different regions. Agriculture and 
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Mining are very important in China and ROW. Services are less important by contrast in these two regions 
compared with the rest. The four sectors, to which FDI accrues (Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and 
Machinery) appear in bold. They account for 9.2% of Chinese GDP. In East Asia, whose GDP structure in 
manufacturing is very similar to that of China, their weight is 13.3% of GDP. The shares in Japan and 
Europe are similar and around 10%. The areas in which they are less relevant are the U.S. (7.5%) and 
ROW (6.4%). 
(Table 1 AROUND HERE) 
The four sectors receiving the shock are vital for the exports of China (64%), East Asia (54.6%) and Japan 
(53.4%), while being less important in the rest of regions. There is a strong network between China and 
East Asia, in which Japan also participates although it is less integrated than the two previous areas. We 
summarize this in Figure 2. There we can see that East Asia provides the vast majority of total Chinese 
imports ranging from 70.5% in Electronics to 46.8% in Chemicals, with the smallest share in Machinery 
of 36.5%. The next most important supplier for China is Japan, which accounts for around 15% of 
Chinese imports, with the exception of Machinery where it provides 25.9%.Taking into account that 
86.3%, 96.9%, 84.5% and 68% of total Chinese imports are of intermediates in Textiles, Chemicals, 
Electronics and Machinery, respectively, there must be a strong network by which East Asia and, to a 
lesser extent Japan, provide intermediates to be further processed in China.  
(Figure 2 AROUND HERE) 
Figure 2 also shows that Chinese export structure contrasts drastically with that of the imports. More than 
70% of total Chinese exports go to the U.S., EU and ROW. Imports from EAS, which is Chinese next 
important destination (after the U.S., EU and ROW) are mostly intermediates. This suggests that most of 
the Chinese final goods go to the U.S., EU and ROW, although there may be also intermediates in those 
Chinese exports to be further processed in those areas of the world
3
.  
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In the U.S. services account for the bigger share in exports (Table 1). Exports of Motor vehicles are very 
important for Japan, while ROW depends heavily on its Mining exports. Textiles exports are very 
important in China and less important in the rest of regions. The four sectors experiencing FDI increases 
account for 53.5% of overall Chinese imports and 43.2% in overall East Asian imports, while their weight 
in imports from the rest of regions is smaller. 
Table 2 presents each region’s weight in world GDP, exports and imports focusing on the sectors where 
the FDI shock takes place in China. The brackets of the columns labelled “World” further offer the 
importance of the sector in the world GDP, exports and imports. Even though China has a small weight in 
total world GDP (6.3 %) in 2007, it still generates important shares of global value added in these four 
sectors, particularly, in Textiles (16.7%) and Electronics (14.3%). Further, its contribution to world 
exports in these two latter sectors is of remarkable importance, 30.7% and 22.1%, respectively. China, 
Japan and East Asia nearly account for half of world exports of Electronics and Textiles. The three regions 
share a trade pattern by which their role in exports tends to surpass by far their role in imports (i.e., they 
constitute the “trade surplus” areas in the world). The contrary applies to the U.S., and to a lesser extent, 
ROW and Europe (i.e., the “trade deficit” areas). Europe is the largest single region in the creation of 
world value added, exports and imports in the four sectors considered. It stands out, however, in its 
importance in value added in Chemicals and Machinery and, even more, in exports from these two sectors. 
ROW is relatively important in the production and trade of Textiles but clearly less important in exports 
from the other three sectors. Note that Textiles, in turn, accounts for a very small share in world GDP 
(1.5%) and in world exports which, necessary coincide with world imports (both accounting for 4.6% in 
the total)
4
. Machinery is the most important sector in terms of world trade (13.7%), followed by 
Chemicals with 11.3% and Electronics with 8.4% shares. 
(Table 2 AROUND HERE) 
To sum up, in 2007 China accounts for rather reduced shares in world GDP, exports and imports. In the 
sectors receiving the FDI shock, however, China is considerably more important than on average in the 
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world. The data we have analyzed point to the existence of a strong integration of China with East Asia 
and to a less intense one of China with Japan. Both areas do supply most of the intermediates that are 
further processed in China. The U.S., EU and ROW are not important supplier of intermediates but play 
more the role of markets for China. The EU is by far the region with highest weights in GDP, exports and 
imports.  
THE MODEL AND SIMULATION 
We use a multilevel model that combines the technology of production of firms (their overall cost 
structures and output levels) together with the demand side of the economies (e.g., how much production 
of each sector is demanded internally or exported), and the presence of factor markets (labor and capital 
demanded for production and their corresponding remunerations). This methodology which is technically 
called a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, tries to grasp how shocks (e.g., the arrival of new 
multinationals to a particular sector) occurring in one part of the economy are spread to the rest. It seeks to 
offer results at lower levels (such as production, labor demand, prices, costs) in different sectors and also 
at the higher levels (GDP, welfare, aggregate trade flows and wages) for all the regions considered within 
the same model. Interestingly it quantifies those shocks occurring at the different levels. Our model is the 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) version (Rutherford, 2005) of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) model (Hertel, 1997). It is explained technically in Zhou & Latorre (2014a). Note, 
however, that in the present version we reinvigorate the analysis with different factors, regions and sectors 
compared to our previous studies. 
Since we want to explore the role of FDI, we simulate a shock of changes in the capital stock brought 
about by FDI inflows. It consists of a simultaneous increase in the capital stock of the Chinese sectors of 
Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery. Based on the data from NBSC (various years), the 
accumulated FDI inflow, proxied by fixed asset investment funded by foreign capital, in Electronics has 
nearly doubled during the period of 2004—2011, the increase was around 50% in Machinery, and 30% in 
both Chemicals and Textiles. Thus, we simulate a shock corresponding to those sectoral capital stock 
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increases simultaneously, keeping the capital stock in rest sectors and regions fixed. Of course, this 
evolution of FDI flows is one of the outcomes of the complex process giving rise to foreign MNEs, as 
developed in the OLI paradigm (e.g., Dunning, 1980, 1988, 2000; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). In our 
approach we do not delve into the determinants of FDI accruing to China but rather try to estimate the 
impact of the actual flows that have taken place.   
One important point about our modeling strategy is that we isolate the impact of FDI in the adjustment of 
the model. This contrasts with other techniques, such as econometrics, which looks for causality in data 
that are the result of a complex interplay of different forces. Our initial dataset is also the result of 
complex economic forces across regions. However, once it is in place, we only introduce in the model a 
shock that changes capital stocks in the sector to which FDI accrues. This implies that the subsequent 
adjustments only respond to the change in levels of FDI. By comparing percent changes across variables 
of the model with respect to the initial dataset we have isolated the impact of FDI.  
Note that FDI (and its related capital) goes to different sectors which use different technologies. This 
means that “the same amount of FDI flows” will have a distinct impact depending on the particular sector 
involved in the shock. Indeed, in the model capital is assumed to be sector specific, i.e., the capital used in, 
say, chemicals will be different to the one used in other sectors. It is true that MNEs carry with them a rich 
set of tangible and intangible assets whose effects can hardly be proxied by data on capital stocks. 
Decades ago Hymer (1976) and Dunning (1977) draw attention to the peculiarities of the multinational 
firm and, somehow, turn the analysis of FDI from capital moving across countries into an analysis of 
special firms (MNEs). However, trying to model and quantify that process seems an effort in which the 
profession is still struggling. Interestingly, Tian (2007) finds that it is foreign firms’ capital in China 
which has positive effect of technology spillovers on the productivity of domestic firms, rather than their 
foreign products or employment which are insignificant in his analysis. Tian even identifies that “the 
positive effect of FDI technology spillovers through capital comes mainly from foreign participation in 
tangible assets rather than from foreign participation in intangible assets” (Tian, 2007: 153). Furthermore, 
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among developing countries FDI taking the form of greenfield investment is more common than in 
developed economies. In particular, foreign mergers and acquisitions in China account for 7.3% in the 
period 1990-2010, compared to a world average of 38.9% (Liu, Lu & Zhang, 2015). Therefore, capital is 
an important element of MNEs’ effects. 
This assumption of specific capital also implies that capital is fixed and cannot move across sectors. As a 
consequence, our results should be interpreted as the short run outcome, i.e., the impact after two or three 
years. Further, the assumption of specific capital also involves that its remuneration will differ across 
sectors. Labor, by contrast, is fully mobile within regions and its endowments are fixed. Therefore the 
wage will be the same within each of the regions considered in the model. 
The upper-level results, or macroeconomic outcomes, arise from the aggregation of all sectoral results. 
Additionally, the resulting aggregates have to fulfill equations reflecting the national accounts identities. 
These latter equations reproduce the circular flow of the economy: production, income distribution, and 
(domestic and foreign) demand. After the simulation, factor remunerations in the sectors receiving a shock 
will be changed (i.e., the rental rate of capital and the overall wage will vary). As a consequence, those 
sectors will readjust their factor demands, intermediate inputs, prices, production, exports and imports. 
The rest of sectors respond to the shock as well, changing their inputs, production and price. National 
income changes due to the change of capital stock and its remuneration and also due to the adjustment of 
the overall wage. Domestic demand for private consumption and intermediates adjust to national income 
and output changes, respectively.  
However, the export orientation, domestic/imported intermediate intensity and private consumption 
orientation vary largely in the four sectors studied. We have analyzed this in detail in Zhou& Latorre 
(2014a; 2014b) and Latorre et al. (2009). Given the division and collaboration through production 
networks and other trade patterns, the rest of regions respond differently to the changes of Chinese trade. 
As a result, they will also adjust production, imports, and exports, as well as other variables.  
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RESULTS 
Sectoral results  
Table 3 presents the percentage change in output and the differences with respect to the initial dataset of 
the value of exports and imports across all regions and sectors.  
(Table 3 AROUND HERE) 
Chinese production in the sectors receiving FDI will expand heavily. The larger the FDI increase, the 
higher the output goes up. Therefore, the biggest increase takes place in Electronics (30.3%) and the 
smallest in Textiles (1.2%). The arrival of FDI will decrease the price of goods, enhancing the 
competitiveness in exports with the only exception of Textiles
5
. Chinese exports increase dramatically, 
crowding out exports from the rest of regions in Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals, which explains 
their respective reductions in production in those sectors. This will bring about a mild fall in overall 
production across regions, which contrasts with the Chinese output expansion (see row “Total” at the 
bottom of Table 3).  
Chinese exports in the sectors receiving FDI crowd out all exports across all the rest of regions. Only one 
exception to this general trend arises in Chemicals, in which Europe and Japan escape from the reductions 
in exports. The world predominance of Europe in foreign trade of Chemicals is clear in Table 2 above. 
Besides, Europe is a very important provider of Chemicals for ROW and will not be displaced by Chinese 
exports in this area. Japan accounts for higher Chinese import shares in this sector and will benefit from 
the increase in Chinese production sufficiently enough so as to compensate the exports lost in the rest of 
regions
6
.  
China will export less in several sectors, especially in Metals and Services, which will turn out to be 
supplied by the rest of regions excluding ROW. In the case of Metals, the overall increase in Chinese 
production brings about a higher demand for this product in order to be used as an intermediate. 
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Regarding Services, the expansion of national income, stemming from FDI inflows, explains the rising 
demand for this private consumption oriented sector. The increase in Chinese output and lower exports in 
Food and Beverages is also related to higher national income. Exports from Textiles do not follow the 
general pattern of sectors receiving FDI, because they will be more demanded with higher private 
consumption. Therefore, the amount of Textiles exports from China will shrink.  
Chinese aggregate exports increase and so do those of the other regions with the exception of ROW. 
Aggregate imports accruing to China go up as well. This is because more intermediates are needed for 
higher levels of production and for the rising Chinese private consumption. By contrast, overall imports in 
other regions will be reduced. As we shall see shortly, national income decreases (so does production) in 
them (again with the exception of ROW).  
Looking at the absolute values of exports and imports, we find that the largest adjustments (in real value) 
occur in Electronics, Chemicals, Metals and Services. Interestingly, the exports of Services and Metals 
counteract to some extent the evolution of foreign trade in the sectors where the shock in FDI takes place 
in China. Chinese competitiveness does crowd out exports in the other regions, but those regions still 
manage to compensate that phenomenon by increasing their exports in the sectors in which China is now 
exporting less. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by the percentage changes in the four main sectors, which are 
calculated as the change in absolute values reflected in Table 3, with respect to the value of exports in 
each sector and region in the initial dataset. Looking at China and its exports of Electronics and 
Machinery we find the important increases it experiences (29.6% and 16.2%, respectively) after the FDI 
shock. Its overall imports of Machinery will go down (-2.8%) because it will substitute imported 
Machinery by the cheaper Machinery it now produces. Imports of Electronics in China rise by (10.1%), 
since this production, in contrast with Machinery, relies very heavily on imported intermediates. 
(Figure 3 AROUND HERE) 
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China will however, export considerably less of Metals (-19.2%) and services (-21.6%) of which it will 
import more (15.3% and 18.1%, respectively). This will expand heavily the exports of the rest of regions 
in these two sectors, which will go mainly to satisfy Chinese rising appetite from them, reducing the 
amount exported to other destinations.  
All in all, Figure 3 shows that while exports of most regions in Electronics and Machinery fall there is a 
compensating force in the increase of exports from Services and Metals. We also find that overall imports 
and exports in the world increase after the shock across the four sectors considered.  
Let us turn to analyze the evolution of East Asia, which is so heavily integrated with Chinese production. 
Table 3 shows that East Asia reduces total exports in the sectors in which Chinese export competition 
becomes more aggressive, despite its role as Chinese intermediate supplier in the Asian networks. It 
exports more to China but it is displaced by China in the other markets. We will briefly illustrate this point 
by showing the bilateral import and export trade in Electronics, where the largest volumes of trade are 
affected.  
Figure 4 shows the bilateral trade changes (in billions of dollars) of Electronics after the shock. One of the 
axis shows the ‘Exporter’ and the other one the ‘Importer’. Take ‘China’ in the ‘Exporter’ axis and the 
‘EU’ in the ‘Importer’ axis as an example —the pink cone of Figure 4, the bilateral change of 20.9 means 
that the Electronics exports from China to Europe increase in 20.9 billions or the imports of Europe from 
China go up by that amount. ‘Total imports’ in the ‘Exporter’ axis, shows the overall import change of 
importers shown in the ‘Importer’ Axis. For instance, the navy blue cone, whose dimensions are ‘Total 
imports’ in ‘Exporter’ axis and ‘CHN’ in ‘Importer’ axis, means that the overall imports of China increase 
by 19.1 billions (which coincides with overall Chinese imports in Electronics in Table 3). Similarly the 
light yellow cone, with dimension of ‘China’ in the ‘Exporter’ axis and ‘total exports’ in the ‘Importer 
axis’, means that the overall exports of China go up by 81.3 billions (as shown in Table 3).  
(Figure 4 AROUND HERE) 
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Chinese exports of Electronics mainly go to the U.S., Europe and ROW, which are the biggest markets for 
its exports (Figure 2). Overall exports across all regions are heavily crowded out, even though they all 
increase the exports going to China. East Asia experiences the highest increases in exports going to China 
(14.6 billions) but it faces the fierce competition of Chinese exports in the rest of markets. This latter 
effect predominates and its overall exports go down (-7.6 billions). This leads us to say that being 
integrated in Chinese production networks as an intermediate supplier does not guarantee profits.  
Aggregate results  
Table 4 presents the percentage change of the overall wage, the rental rate of capital, national income 
which is a proxy for welfare, the capital stock, aggregate imports and exports, as well as, GDP across 
regions. 
(Table 4 AROUND HERE) 
FDI accruing to China will increase its capital stock by 7.36%. This will improve labor productivity and 
therefore wages by 0.42%. An accumulation of capital causes a reduction in its remuneration of 1.99%. 
The increase in wages, together with a higher capital stock, leads to a strong expansion of national income 
and welfare (11.54%)
7
. As a result, aggregate imports rise heavily (7.84%), propelled by higher demand 
and production, while exports also rise although less intensively by 2.90%. Recall the sectors receiving the 
FDI increase heavily their exports but due to the rise of national income and production, exports in other 
sectors will be reduced. Finally, all these forces drive up GDP in China by 2.68%. These findings are in 
accordance with our previous studies on the impact of FDI on host economies (Gómez-Plana and Latorre, 
2014; Latorre 2012, 2013). They are also consistent with the overall positive outcomes expected by 
Meyer (2004: 273): “I share the view of most observers that in most cases, MNEs play a positive role”. 
They also make sense in the context of Chinese level of development, as recently analyzed by Meyer & 
Sinani (2009), using a very different methodology. 
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The adjustments are logically of smaller magnitude for the rest of regions. Because production shrinks 
slightly in all of them (Table 3), wages, and often the rental rate of capital, will diminish. The decrease is 
most intense in East Asia, Japan and Europe. In these regions, the weight in GDP of the three sectors 
where Chinese exports increase most (Electronics, Machinery and Chemical) is the highest (Table 1). 
Chinese competition crowds out exports of the rest of regions in these sectors, thus, reducing their output. 
As shown in Table 1, East Asia is the region in which these sectors account for a higher GDP (13.3%). 
Accordingly, wages and the rental rate of capital experience the largest decrease in East Asia. In the 
opposite extreme, ROW and the U.S. exhibit the lowest weight of GDP in these three sectors (5.3% and 
6.6%, respectively). This explains why the fall in wages is the smallest in these two regions and the capital 
rental even increases. This evolution of factor’s remunerations lies behind the outcomes on national 
income and GDP. GDP, indeed, decreases most in East Asia, followed by Japan and Europe. The U.S. 
also undergoes a reduction in national income and GDP, while ROW, whose capital rental increases 
heavily, exhibits rises in both national income and GDP. Recall the GDP structure in ROW is quite 
protected from Chinese competition, since it heavily relies on Mining, Agriculture and Services in which 
Chinese exports are going down.  
The fall in national income, which drives down private consumption across all regions, explains the 
reduction in aggregate imports (except in China and ROW). Aggregate exports, by contrast, rise slightly 
due to the higher exports in the sectors in which China competes less.  
All in all, China benefits from FDI inflows. ROW also benefits because its economic structure differs 
from the one in China. The contrary applies to East Asia, whose GDP manufacturing structure closely 
follows that of the Asiatic giant. As a result, East Asia is heavily crowed out in important sectors that 
coincide with the ones in which China becomes very aggressive. Japan and Europe are intermediate cases 
in the sense that they are crowded out in some sectors but are able to compensate that by exporting more 
in others. Finally, the U.S. is less harmed than Japan or Europe due to its low exposure to Chinese 
competition.  
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Sensitivity Analysis  
We carry out an Unconditional Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison, Jones, Kimbell & Wigle, 1993), 
in which we change two critical elasticities: 1) The Amington elasticity (substitution between imports and 
domestic production and 2) The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. We halve and double 
their values in all the sectors and regions while keeping the rest of elasticities at their initial value.  
Table 5 offers the percentage changes of the aggregate variables with the new elasticities. The row labeled 
“bench” repeats, for the sake of comparison, the results obtained with the original elasticities, i.e., the ones 
from Table 4. Percentages adjustments in GDP are negligible across regions, even though for China the 
higher the elasticities the slightly higher the GDP turns. This implies that more flexible technologies 
facilitate a more efficient use of resources leading to more growth. Across the rest of variables changes are 
very small with the different elasticities. The causation chain behind the results which has already been 
explained clearly remains applicable. ROW and China would be the only regions that win after the shock.  
With the higher (“double”) elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production, production 
in the sectors receiving FDI increases more than in the benchmark case. Aggregate imports and exports 
will be somewhat higher because more imported intermediates will be used for production and higher 
production will lead to more exports in these sectors. In order to produce more in the FDI receiving 
sectors a higher amount of labor needs to be reallocated to them. This will raise the wage and bring about 
a lower rental rate of capital. The latter effect prevails reducing national income, always compared to the 
central case we had already analyzed.  
With a lower (“half”) elasticity of substitution between labor and capital production in the sectors 
receiving FDI is also larger than in the central scenario. Because more labor needs to go to those sectors 
the wage will be higher, but the rental rate of capital will be smaller leading to lower national income. 
Production in the FDI sectors is higher, which brings about higher aggregate imports of Chinese 
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intermediates. However, their higher production does not translate in overall higher Chinese exports 
because other sectors are exporting less.  
But note that the key for the adjustment in the rest of regions would be the weight in their GDP of the 
sectors involved in the FDI shock. We get a more negative outcome in East Asia because in that region the 
weight in GDP of Electronics, Machinery and Chemical is the highest across regions. GDP is also slightly 
worse in Japan and the EU and slightly better in ROW with the half value of this elasticity. These trends 
should be familiar to us since they again reflect that the higher the increase in production in the FDI 
receiving sectors in China the more harmful their effects for the rest of regions are with the exception of 
ROW. 
CONCLUSIONS 
By 2007 China accounted for a relatively small share in World GDP (6.3%), exports (8.3%) and imports 
(6.5%). This was far from the weights of regions like Europe (31%, 39.7% and 40.8%, respectively) or the 
U.S. (25.2%, 9.2% and 14.5%, respectively). However, the arrival of FDI inflows to Chinese 
manufacturing seems to have produced negative effects in many regions of the world. When Chinese 
exports increase, due to FDI, exports and production shrink in the sectors that compete with them across 
the rest of regions. The latter experience an overall reduction in production which drives down wages and 
the capital rent, thus, reducing their national income and GDP.  
We simulate the real FDI increases that have taken place in Chinese Electronics, Machinery, Chemicals 
and Textiles. Interestingly, our approach allows isolating the impact of FDI from other economic sources. 
The four sectors account for 64.5% and 53.5% of Chinese overall exports and imports, respectively, while 
their weight is of 38.1% in total world exports (or imports). China benefits from the FDI inflows, since 
there is a rise in wages (0.42%), GDP (2.68%) and national income (11.54%). Chinese export 
competitiveness increases very heavily in Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals. East Asia is the region 
that is most negatively affected, even though it has strong connections through production networks with 
 18 
 
China. It will export more in those sectors in which China compete less after the FDI increase. Further, it 
will, generally, supply important intermediates for the sectors in which China increases production, but it 
will be displaced by China in the rest of markets. The main negative outcomes for East Asia arise from its 
decrease in production in the sectors in which China is more aggressive (Electronics, Machinery and 
Chemicals). These three sectors explain 13.3% of GDP in East Asia, the highest share among all the 
regions considered. As a consequence, its fall in GDP is the largest across all regions (-0.4%, 
approximately).  
In Japan and Europe the weight in GDP of Electronics, Machinery and Chemicals is 8.6% and 9.1%, 
respectively. Their Chemicals sectors are the only case of survival to Chinese competition in sectors that 
have received the FDI. Indeed, except in these latter cases, China crowds out exports across all regions 
when it becomes more competitive due to FDI. Despite this virtuous evolution of Chemicals, overall 
production still shrinks in Japan and Europe, driving their GDP down by 0.26% in both areas. In the U.S., 
the weight in GDP of the three sectors, in which Chinese competition rises strongly, is lower than the 
three previous regions. This, together with its smaller openness to trade and big importance in services (in 
which China export less), considerably reduces its negative outcomes in GDP (-0.10%).  
The Rest of the world (ROW) is the only region that we have analyzed that is positively affected by the 
Chinese booming economy. ROW is protected from Chinese competition because in its GDP sectors like 
Mining and Agriculture account for the biggest shares. In fact, ROW’s exports from these sectors are 
primarily going to satisfy Chinese rising demand for Agricultural products and Mining resources.  
In the light of the literature on FDI and global production networks, this paper finds that engaging in 
networks in China does not guarantee profitable outcomes. Our multilevel model allows analyzing the role 
of regions as final markets. We could a priori expect that consumers would benefit from cheaper Chinese 
imports. This does not seem to be the case, either. Europe, the U.S. and ROW are the main destinations of 
Chinese exports. These may become cheaper, but the point is that Europe, the U.S. and ROW are also 
important producers in the world and the outcomes show that workers suffer from losses in wages. Our 
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analysis reveals that the forces from the production side of the economy are more important than the ones 
from the consumption side. As we have said, this benefits ROW but will harm Europe and the U.S. 
although in a different magnitude.  
All in all, our paper suggests that the best industrial policies outside China should be to further strengthen 
the comparative advantage in the sectors in which China competes less. 
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Table 1 Definition of sectors and their relative importance in each region's GDP, Exports and Imports (2007) 
Sector/Goods Definition 
GDP (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW 
01-14  Agriculture 11.0 1.2 5.5 1.0 1.7 6.6 0.9 0.1 0.8 3.8 1.6 3.8 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.3 2.2 2.6 
15-18 Mining 4.0 0.1 3.7 1.2 0.7 11.0 0.5 0.1 3.4 1.1 1.1 32.6 13.9 23.3 12.7 12.6 6.9 7.3 
19-26 Food & 
Beverages 
3.2 3.3 3.5 2.2 4.1 4.5 2.0 0.4 3.4 3.1 5.2 4.9 1.8 5.2 3.3 2.9 4.8 4.8 
27-29 Textiles 4.1 0.6 2.0 0.8 1.7 1.6 17.2 1.1 5.2 1.4 3.5 3.9 2.7 5.1 3.3 5.8 4.8 4.6 
30-31 Woods & Paper 2.1 1.8 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.5 4.2 0.7 2.3 2.7 4.0 2.6 1.9 2.7 1.7 3.6 3.7 3.0 
32 Petroleum 0.6 2.6 2.3 0.5 2.1 1.3 1.8 1.5 3.9 4.1 2.2 6.3 2.4 3.8 4.3 3.5 3.0 4.4 
33 Chemicals 5.7 2.5 4.0 2.6 3.6 2.4 7.4 12.2 10.8 13.3 15.3 6.0 12.5 7.8 10.5 8.4 13.0 10.9 
34-37 Metals 7.4 3.0 3.7 2.2 3.7 3.5 9.8 9.2 6.5 6.1 9.5 10.2 8.4 6.8 10.0 6.7 9.5 9.8 
38-39 Motor Vehicles 2.5 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.7 2.0 3.3 24.1 6.1 14.5 13.0 5.9 4.2 4.3 4.5 12.5 11.1 12.4 
40 Electronics 3.0 2.8 4.6 0.6 1.0 0.8 22.5 13.5 25.3 6.8 4.5 2.3 20.2 9.0 15.4 11.0 5.7 5.4 
41 Machinery 6.5 3.2 4.8 3.5 4.4 2.1 17.4 26.6 13.3 16.5 16.5 5.2 18.2 10.5 14.0 13.5 12.5 15.3 
42 Other manufacturing 2.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.8 6.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.4 1.6 1.2 3.4 1.7 1.5 
43-45 Electricity & Gas 
& Water 
3.4 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 
46 Construction 6.3 6.4 5.7 6.3 7.1 6.7 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.9 
47-57 Services 37.9 67.4 52.8 72.5 61.5 52.2 6.2 8.2 16.8 24.5 21.1 13.8 10.3 16.0 16.2 14.3 19.8 16.5 
Whole economy 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: The definition of sectors follows the ISIC Rev 3 Classification. CHN, JPN, EAS, US, EU and ROW stand for China, Japan, East Asia, United States, 
Europe and Rest of the world, respectively. East Asia is constituted by Republic of Korea, Taipei China, Hong Kong China, and ASEAN countries (Singapore, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic Lao, Malaysia, Philippine, Thailand and Vietnam). 
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Table 2 Each region's weight in world GDP, exports and imports of Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery (2007) 
Sector 
Regional % in world sectoral GDP  
World 
Regional % in world sectoral exports 
World 
Regional % in world sectoral imports 
World 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW 
Textiles 16.7 3.2 7.0 13.6 34.4 25.1 100 (1.5) 30.7 1.2 12.7 2.7 30.3 22.4 100 (4.6) 3.7 5.0 7.0 18.3 41.6 24.4 100 (4.6) 
Chemicals 11.3 6.4 6.6 20.7 35.9 19.0 100 (3.1) 5.4 5.4 10.7 10.8 53.6 14.0 100 (11.3) 7.3 3.1 9.2 10.8 46.0 23.6 100 (11.3) 
Electronics 14.3 16.9 18.6 10.8 24.3 15.2 100 (1.3) 22.1 8.1 34.0 7.5 21.1 7.2 100 (8.4) 15.3 4.9 17.8 19.0 27.7 15.4 100 (8.4) 
Machinery 11.0 6.9 6.8 24.0 37.4 14.0 100 (3.7) 10.5 9.7 11.0 11.1 47.6 10.1 100 (13.7) 8.5 3.5 9.9 14.4 36.8 27.0 100 (13.7) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: see Table 1 
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Table 3 Impact on output (% change), exports (change in billions $) and imports (change in billions $) 
Sectors 
Output (% change) Exports (change in billions $) Imports (change in billions $) 
CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW World CHN JPN EAS US EU ROW World 
Agriculture 2.0  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  -3.3  0.0  0.5  1.7  1.6  3.4  3.8  5.9  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -1.5  0.1  3.8  
Mining -0.3  0.8  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1  -0.5  0.0  0.6  0.6  0.6  4.9  6.2  7.6  0.1  0.5  -2.0  -1.2  1.2  6.2  
Food & 
Beverages 
3.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.0  0.2  -6.9  0.2  1.2  1.4  4.3  -0.1  0.1  4.4  -1.3  -0.5  -0.9  -2.7  1.1  0.1  
Textiles 1.2  1.6  0.7  1.1  1.1  0.0  -9.7  0.5  1.0  0.7  5.1  -1.2  -3.6  1.6  -0.6  -0.2  -1.8  -3.1  0.4  -3.6  
Woods & Paper -2.5  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.1  -8.8  0.4  0.7  1.3  4.9  0.5  -0.9  2.3  -0.4  -0.1  -2.1  -0.9  0.4  -0.9  
Petroleum 3.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.6  -0.5  -0.2  -1.1  0.2  0.6  0.1  -0.2  0.0  -0.4  1.5  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -1.0  -0.2  -0.4  
Chemicals 6.9  -0.1  -0.7  -0.1  0.1  -0.8  7.0  0.2  -1.2  -0.2  2.0  -4.4  3.5  2.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -1.2  2.2  3.5  
Metals -0.2  1.4  0.8  0.8  1.2  -0.0  -23.0  4.2  2.5  3.9  15.3  1.7  4.7  12.0  -0.8  -0.8  -3.3  -1.5  -1.0  4.7  
Motor Vehicles -1.2  1.1  0.0  0.4  0.4  -0.5  -5.9  3.0  -0.1  2.1  6.3  -2.6  2.9  3.8  -0.2  -0.1  -0.7  -1.8  1.9  2.9  
Electronics 30.3  -2.9  -2.0  -5.8  -4.6  -4.2  81.3  -5.2  -7.6  -8.6  -15.1  -6.7  38.0  19.1  3.4  0.0  10.8  0.8  3.8  38.0  
Machinery 8.5  -0.9  -1.6  -1.0  -0.9  -2.2  34.6  -2.1  -4.2  -5.8  -11.8  -8.1  2.6  -4.7  0.8  -0.1  3.2  -0.4  3.9  2.6  
Other 
manufacturing 
-2.0  0.9  0.7  1.8  1.0  0.2  -8.1  0.4  0.3  0.7  3.2  0.1  -3.5  0.4  -0.4  -0.2  -1.5  -2.0  0.2  -3.5  
Electricity & 
Gas & Water 
3.6  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  -0.7  -0.4  0.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.5  0.1  -0.4  
Construction 0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.7  0.2  -0.0  0.1  0.8  -0.2  0.1  0.3  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.3  0.2  0.1  
Services 2.9  0.0  0.2  0.0  -0.0  0.1  -16.3  2.2  5.6  4.7  18.7  -6.5  8.5  17.5  -1.6  -1.6  -1.8  -9.5  5.5  8.5  
Total 3.8  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.1  38.2  4.3  0.0  2.7  36.3  -19.7  61.8  73.9  -1.2  -3.5  -0.8  -26.5  19.9  61.8  
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 4 Impact on aggregate variables (% change) 
Aggregate variables China Japan East Asia United States Europe Rest of the world 
Wage 0.42 -0.36 -0.58 -0.18 -0.33 -0.22 
Rental rate of Capital -1.99 -0.32 -0.31 0.06 -0.22 0.48 
National income (Welfare) 11.54 -0.32 -0.41 -0.07 -0.81 0.51 
Capital stock 7.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Imports 7.86 -0.19 -0.25 -0.04 -0.44 0.56 
Exports 2.90 0.60 0.02 0.25 0.63 -0.47 
GDP 2.68 -0.26 -0.40 -0.10 -0.26 0.18 
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
 
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis—impacts on aggregate variables (% change) 
FDI shock 
GDP Imports Exports 
CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW 
Bench  2.7  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  7.9  -0.2  -0.2  -0.0  -0.4  0.6  2.9  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.6  -0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestic production 
Half 2.6  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  7.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3  0.3  2.0  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.8  -0.7  
Double 2.8  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  8.5  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  -0.6  0.9  3.9  0.6  0.1  0.5  0.4  -0.1  
Elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital 
Half 2.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  9.6  -0.3  -0.3  -0.0  -0.6  0.7  2.7  0.7  0.1  0.3  0.9  -0.6  
Double 3.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.1  6.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.0  -0.3  0.4  3.0  0.5  -0.0  0.2  0.4  -0.3  
FDI shock 
Wage Rental rate of capital National income 
CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW CHN JAP EAS USA EU ROW 
Bench         0.4  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -2.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.5  11.5  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.8  0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestic production 
Half 0.2  -0.3  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -1.9  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.5  11.8  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.9  0.5  
Double 0.7  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -2.1  -0.3  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.5  11.1  -0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.7  0.5  
Elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital 
Half 1.4  -0.5  -0.8  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3  -3.4  -0.4  -0.5  0.1  -0.3  0.6  12.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.1  -1.1  0.6  
Double -0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -1.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.4  10.9  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.5  0.4  
Source: Authors’ simulation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al,. 2012) 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Figure 1 Multilevel data in the model (2007) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
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Figure 2 Main trade relationships in Textiles, Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery among regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ caculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012) 
Note: see Table 1.
CHN 
JPN EAS 
Imports mainly from its area 
except Machinery from JPN 
and Textiles from CHN 
Imports mainly from CHN 
and EAS except Chemicals 
from EU then EAS and CHN 
Exports mainly to China then 
itself except Textiles exports 
to US, EU and ROW 
Machinery from JPN and 
Textiles from CHN 
Exports mainly to CHN 
and EAS 
% of Chinese Exports to U.S., EU & ROW: 
Textiles:     77.9 (U.S.: 23.6 & EU: 24.5 & ROW: 29.8)  
Chemicals: 70.4 (U.S.: 20.2 & EU: 19.1 & ROW: 31.1)  
Electronics:75.7 (U.S.: 32.4 & EU: 25.2 & ROW: 18.1)  
Machinery: 74.1 (U.S.: 23.8 & EU: 23.6 & ROW: 26.7)  
 
% of Chinese Imports from JPN & EAS: 
Textiles:      70    (JPN: 13.8   &  EAS: 56.2 )  
Chemicals:  64.6 (JPN: 17.9   &  EAS: 46.7 )  
Electronics: 86.3 (JPN: 15.9   & EAS: 70.5 )  
Machinery:  62.4 (JPN: 25.9   & EAS: 36.5 ) 
 
 
 
Exports mainly to ROW and 
then EU; Electronics also 
mainly to EAS 
Textiles and Electronics imports 
mainly from CHN and EAS; 
Chemicals and Machinery 
mainly from EU and ROW 
Imports dominantly from its 
area; Textiles and Electronics 
also largely from CHN 
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then a small share to ROW, 
every few to the rest of regions  
Exports mainly to US, its 
own region and EU 
Imports mainly from EU except 
Textiles mainly from China 
U.S. ROW 
EU 
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Figure 3 Impact on exports and imports of Metals, Services, Electronics and Machinery across regions (% change) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1.
 33 
 
Figure 4 Impact on Electronics bilateral trade (change in Billions $) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GTAP 8 Data Base (Narayanan et al., 2012). 
Note: See Table 1. 
